The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a historic deal on June 27, 2025, in Washington, DC, brokered by the United States and supported by Qatar. The agreement, which aims to end more than three decades of conflicts in eastern Congo, is intended to stabilise the region by neutralising armed groups, restoring bilateral relations, and enabling cooperation in economic development. While several international actors have hailed the agreement as a diplomatic breakthrough, it has drawn considerable criticism for its omission of justice and reparations for the victims. The agreement focuses on security and resource extraction without addressing the legacy of mass atrocities and violations of international law, and thus risks reinforcing impunity and perpetuating the cycle of violence. This article by EUGÈNE BAKAMA BOPE and IBRAHIM SANDA BARRIE examines the Washington peace agreement, critically analyses its lack of mechanisms for justice and reparations, and questions its long-term enforceability.
The peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda is among the latest efforts to stop decades of instability in eastern Congo, where armed groups such as M23 (alleged to be supported by Rwanda) and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR – Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) rebel group, a Hutu militia formed after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, flourished.
The agreement provides for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory, here described as the “lifting of Rwanda defensive measures”; the neutralisation of the FDLR, along with commitments to cease support for armed groups; and to begin disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of non-state combatants.
The sequence of these actions is critical: the DRC has in the past insisted that Rwandan forces must first leave occupied areas in its territory before it can effectively neutralise the FDLR, claiming that the long-standing Rwandan presence undermines Congolese operational control and sovereignty. This insistence reflects a realistic concern: expelling the FDLR requires clear control of the territory. Complicating matters further is the fact that accurately identifying FDLR members is a major challenge as the group has split into small cells and integrated into local communities, making intelligence gathering and targeted operations difficult.
Second, the agreement establishes a bilateral security and monitoring commission tasked with overseeing DDR and coordinating joint security initiatives. Third, it establishes a framework for cross-border economic cooperation, including infrastructure development and trade facilitation. Most significantly, the United States has secured preferential access to strategic Congolese minerals, including cobalt, coltan, copper, 3T (tin, tantalum, tungsten), and lithium – resources that are vital to the green and digital economies.
The Washington agreement builds on previous negotiations brokered by Qatar but excludes key non-state actors such as M23/AFC, which controls parts of North Kivu. This is not accidental but rather a structural outcome of the negotiation process. It is important to clarify that the Doha (Qatar) talks are a direct negotiation track between the government of DRC and the M23/AFC and are intentionally designed as a bilateral engagement distinct from the inter-state framework of the Washington agreement. This separation, while tactically pragmatic, presents a challenge: M23/AFC is just one among nearly 100 armed groups operating in eastern DRC, and addressing it in isolation risks neglecting the broader conflict ecosystem. To enhance legitimacy and effectiveness, the Doha process should expand to include other key armed groups, particularly those with significant territorial control or civilian impact. Failing to do so could open up new power vacuums or allow parallel ones to persist.
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On July 19, 2025, representatives of the DRC government and the M23 rebel group signed a declaration of principles to end the fighting in eastern Congo. The parties are expected to come up with a substantive agreement in August 2025.
While the Washington agreement justifiably excluded civil society organisations (CSOs) due to its nature as a state-to-state accord, this logic cannot be applied to the Qatar-led intra-Congolese negotiations. For sustainable peace, CSOs, victims’ associations, and community leaders must be included in the Doha talks as they are essential to addressing grievances, shaping transitional justice, and rebuilding social cohesion and trust. The absence of these groups not only sidelines local ownership of the process but also weakens post-conflict accountability and reconciliation mechanisms. Inclusion of the Doha track is, therefore, the appropriate and necessary step forward to ensure a truly comprehensive peace process in eastern DRC.
Justice and compensation
One of the most striking shortcomings of the Washington agreement is the complete exclusion of justice and compensation for the victims of the long-running conflict. Decades of violence in the eastern part of the DRC have claimed over 10 million lives, caused widespread displacement of the population, enabled the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, and facilitated the uncontrolled plundering of natural resources. Yet the peace agreement contains no reference to transitional justice, no call for investigation, no mention of accountability, and no framework for compensation for the victims of human rights violations. It only says that parallel justice initiatives are recognised, but there are no clear provisions on justice.
This omission is even more serious when viewed in light of a 2010 UN report documenting 617 serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC between 1993 and 2003. The report concluded that many of these incidents may constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or even genocide, and recommended the creation of a hybrid specialised court, a truth and reconciliation commission, and a fund for victim compensation. The Washington agreement ignores all the recommendations.
Resolution 1304 of the UN Security Council (UNSC), adopted following the resumption of fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani (DRC) on June 5, 2000, after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, not only unreservedly condemned the two armed groups and their fighting on Congolese territory as violation of the sovereignty and integrity of the DRC, but also spoke out against all the massacres and other atrocities committed on DRC territory and urged that an international enquiry into these events be opened to bring those responsible to justice. The Security Council believed that the Ugandan and Rwandan governments should provide reparations for the loss of life and material damage they inflicted on the civilian population of Kisangani and requested the UN Secretary General to present it with an assessment of the harm caused, based on which these reparations could be determined. There are no such provisions in the Washington agreement.
Failing to address justice and accountability sends a dangerous signal to perpetrators – that peace can be bought through political compromise and economic exchange while impunity remains unpunished. Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) have publicly criticised the agreement for this omission. According to PHR, “any peace agreement that does not include justice for survivors will perpetuate the legacy of violence and silence the suffering of millions of people.” In addition, Congolese Law No. 22/065, which provides for compensation for victims of conflict-related sexual violence and abuse, remains unenforced and is not mentioned in the agreement.
The absence of reparative justice not only undermines the legal integrity of the agreement but also threatens its sustainability. Studies from post-conflict areas such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and South Africa show that accountability and truth-telling are essential for restoring trust, rebuilding divided communities, and preventing future violence. By neglecting these components, the peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda replicates the “peace first, justice later” approach that has repeatedly failed to end conflicts in the Great Lakes region.
The agreement reflects a broader trend in conflict mediation, where strategic interests – particularly in the area of mineral resources – take precedence over humanitarian issues. In mediating the agreement, the US was primarily motivated by the strategic necessity of limiting Chinese dominance over mineral supply chains in the DRC. As a result, the pact appears to prioritise geopolitical gain over moral responsibility. Nobel Prize winner Dr Denis Mukwege condemned the agreement as a “betrayal of the victims”, noting that “peace without justice is no peace”.
If justice, accountability, and reparations are overlooked under the ongoing peace agreement processes, it risks encouraging impunity among the many countries seeking to establish their zones of influence in their quest for DRC’s resources and perpetuating the long-running cycle of violence.
Guarantees for implementation
In addition to its moral shortcomings, the Washington agreement also suffers from weak enforcement mechanisms. Although it calls for the creation of a joint commission, it is not clear how violations will be monitored, verified, or punished. Unlike earlier agreements, such as the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement on Peace, Security, and Cooperation (2013), which included multilateral oversight by the African Union, the United Nations, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the US-brokered deal appears to be largely bilateral, with limited multilateral impact. Although UNSC Resolution 2773, which recognises the importance of previous multilateral frameworks, is mentioned in the preamble of the agreement, the reference to the resolution is more declarative than practical – there is no provision in the operative part of the agreement that explicitly links implementation or enforcement mechanisms to it. According to diplomatic sources close to the negotiation process, the Rwandan delegation initially declined to agree to any reference to the UNSC resolution, which explicitly calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces and an end to Rwanda’s support for the M23 movement. The Rwandans bowed to pressure from the American and Qatari mediators, but only agreed to the inclusion of a simple reference to the resolution in the preamble without accepting the binding obligations arising from it.
As a result, the agreement lacks a specific mandate to enforce the resolution. The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is not assigned any formal role in the agreement despite its current mandate to support peace and protect civilians in eastern DRC. The agreement does not empower MONUSCO to monitor compliance or violations, nor does it grant the UN any oversight role through a joint monitoring committee.
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The reference to UNSC Resolution 2773 is more of a diplomatic compromise than a substantive commitment. The failure to incorporate its provisions into the agreement’s implementation structure weakens the multilateral foundation that could have supported sustainable monitoring and accountability.
The exclusion of key armed groups, particularly M23, from the negotiation process also threatens the implementation of the peace agreement. M23 currently controls strategic towns and transport corridors in North Kivu province, and its commanders have declared that any settlement that excludes them is “invalid”. Similarly, the FDLR has shown no willingness to disarm and demobilise under the current framework. Without the support of these influential actors, the agreement risks failing even before it comes into force.
It is important to emphasise that the implementation and sustainability of the Washington agreement are closely linked to the success of the parallel Qatar-led process. The Doha negotiations are designed to address the demands and grievances of the AFC/M23. Qatar’s mediation is vital because disarmament, reintegration, and long-term security in eastern DRC can only be achieved through a direct political settlement with the M23 Movement. Furthermore, unlike the Washington talks, the Doha process offers a real opportunity to involve civil society organisations, religious leaders, women’s groups, and victims’ representatives, which are essential to building local ownership, legitimacy, and trust in the peace process.
Failing to involve these voices risks repeating the mistakes of the Sun City Agreement (2002), whose top-down power-sharing arrangement encouraged armed struggle as a route to political power. This flawed model has become cyclical in the DRC conflict: armed actors are rewarded with positions in government, reinforcing the idea that violence is a legitimate path to influence. To stand any chance of success, the Doha process must go beyond negotiations between elites and involve grassroots stakeholders who represent the moral conscience of the communities affected by the conflict.
President Kagame’s recent statements, in which he expressed doubts about the US-led agreement’s sustainability and alluded to unresolved security concerns, cast further doubt on the political will necessary for its implementation. If Rwanda withdraws from the spirit of the agreement, citing ongoing threats or domestic politics, the fragile peace could collapse. The danger, therefore, lies not only in implementation failure, but also in the possibility of the region entering a “Sun City Peace” scenario, where war becomes a negotiating tactic and political violence is normalised. In this context, the Washington agreement will only be as strong as the Doha process allows it to be.
Thus, for peace to persist, the paths of the two agreements must converge: normalisation at the state level through Washington and comprehensive internal dialogue focused on justice through Doha. Anything less may only serve to delay, rather than prevent, the next cycle of armed confrontation in Congo. It is worth noting that previous peace processes in the DRC, including the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999) and the Sun City Accord (2002), also suffered from limited engagement and subsequently failed due to poor implementation. The current agreement risks repeating these mistakes.
Role of international actors
The United States played a pivotal role in brokering the Washington agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, driven not only by diplomatic concerns but also by strategic interests in the vast mineral wealth of the eastern region. As part of the pact, the US administration has prioritised access to cobalt, lithium and coltan, resources vital to electric vehicles and renewable technologies. The economic provisions of the agreement are designed to give American companies preferential access to explore and process these minerals, prompting critics to describe the agreement as a “resources-for-peace” deal that disproportionately favours foreign investors over local populations.
At the same time, Rwanda, which UN experts and human rights groups have accused of supporting the M23 rebel group, has emerged as a strategic ally of the US in the region, complicating Washington’s credibility as an impartial mediator. Despite growing evidence of Rwanda’s involvement in destabilising eastern Congo, the US has been reluctant to exert real pressure on Kigali, underscoring the geopolitical calculations that often trump human rights concerns.
In contrast, the African Union (AU), which has long advocated “African solutions to African problems”, played only a symbolic role in the peace agreement. Although African Union Commission Chairman Mahmoud Ali Youssouf formally witnessed the signing of the agreement, the AU was not a key party to the negotiations and had no substantive influence on the content of the agreement. This limited participation has drawn criticism, particularly given the central role the AU played in previous frameworks such as the Luanda Process and its broader mandate under Agenda 2063 to promote African-led conflict resolution.
The AU’s marginal position raises deeper questions about the continent’s reliance on external actors to resolve internal conflicts, particularly in contexts where underlying issues are deeply rooted in regional political dynamics and historical grievances. While the AU’s presence at the signing ceremony gave an appearance of continental legitimacy, its exclusion from key negotiations exposed a persistent gap between the continent’s aspirations for autonomy and the reality of peace diplomacy led by external powers. The Washington agreement not only illustrates the dominance of global powers in shaping African peace processes but also highlights the unfinished task of empowering the continent’s institutions to lead their own security and governance agendas.
To sum up, the peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda is diplomatically significant but fundamentally incomplete. Its failure to include justice and reparations for the victims as fundamental pillars undermines both its moral legitimacy and practical sustainability. Peace cannot be built on silencing victims, neglecting accountability, or monetising suffering through mineral extraction agreements. If the history of the Great Lakes region has shown anything, it is that peace without justice is not real peace, but a postponement of conflict.
For the Washington agreement to become a meaningful framework for peace, international actors must push for the inclusion of judicial mechanisms, reparations for victims, inclusive dialogue with all parties involved, and transparent monitoring and enforcement. Only then can the long-suffering people of eastern Congo begin to rebuild their lives with dignity, truth, and hope.
PROF EUGÈNE BAKAMA BOPE is an Associate Professor at the Université Pédagogique Nationale (UPN) in DRC.
IBRAHIM SANDA BARRIE is a researcher from Sierra Leone and an intern at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.
