By all accounts, the multimillion-euro reparations order the International Criminal Court (ICC) recently issued against former Islamic Police boss Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud is a major victory for the rule of law, deterrence of major crimes against humanity, and justice for thousands of his victims, including the 65,202 registered Malians who have suffered as a result of his criminal activities.
An ICC reparation order signals one of the most positive outcomes of the international criminal justice system because it means that the perpetrators of some of the most heinous crimes have been successfully prosecuted, sentenced, and locked away. It means that the victims’ voices have not only been heard, but that they have also received justice and should expect to get some form of amends for the harm they suffered.
However, a closer examination of the history of the past ICC reparation awards paints the picture of a hollow victory for the victims. With only one case ever successfully concluded, the victims in the Al Hassan situation may be well advised to hold off their expectations of getting compensation any time soon, as it seems this case is destined to join the other reparation matters that remain at various stages of non-implementation, many years after they were originally ordered.
In June 2024, Al Hassan was convicted of three counts of crimes against humanity and five counts of war crimes for his role in running the Islamic Police in 2012 and 2013 in Timbuktu, northern Mali, at the time controlled by the armed groups Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and was later sentenced to serve 10 years in prison.
On April 28, 2026, Trial Chamber X issued a reparation order against the former police chief, whom it found liable for the payout of €7,250,000 (approximately equivalent to 4,755,688,250 francs CFA or US$8.4 million). The reparations cover 65,202 estimated victims and order collective, community-based reparations focused on rehabilitation, with specific attention to women and girls. The average allocation per victim is approximately €111 (US$129.4).
Providing assistance to victims
The court’s Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) has the mandate of implementing the reparation awards and is also responsible for providing assistance to victims and their families in ICC situations through “life-changing programmes”.
The TFV was built on three assumptions: That convicted persons would have assets, that states would contribute consistently and at scale, and that the orders would remain manageable.
This supposition has not held. Convicted persons have never meaningfully funded reparation orders in any completed or ongoing case. Most of them have been adjudicated to be indigent, with no assets for the ICC agents to dispose of. Al Hassan has already been declared indigent and, therefore, cannot contribute to the reparations. And the court has not been able to follow up on the cases of the convicts, even those who have completed their jail terms, to find or seize any assets to help to pay for the reparations.
Secondly, member states have not been uniformly faithful in submitting their contributions. The TFV is sustained by voluntary state contributions. From 2023 to 2025, the TFV operated on annual voluntary contributions amounting to between €5 million and €7 million (US$5.68 million and US$8.9 million) against programme costs that consistently exceeded available funding, resulting in persistent deficits and declining reserves, according to ICC financial statements. The donor base has never exceeded 29 states in any year.
Finally, the reparation orders have not remained low and manageable. Instead, they have steadily grown over the years from US$1 million awarded in the Germain Katanga case in 2017 to €52.4 million ordered against Dominic Ongwen in 2024.
The ICC has issued six orders for reparations against six convicted persons from three countries. The combined liability stands at approximately €171 million (about US$198.4 million) against contributions amounting to €53 million (US$61.5 million).
In March 2012, Thomas Lubanga, a former militia commander from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was convicted of the war crime of conscripting child soldiers in Ituri and was sentenced to serve 14 years in prison. The reparation liability was set at US$10 million in December 2017 and confirmed on appeal in July 2019. By December 2024, the TFV had calculated that the amount required was US$10,917,403, and as of March 2025, 1,702 of the 2,471 eligible beneficiaries were enrolled and were receiving rehabilitation, vocational training, and psychological support in Ituri. The programme is still in operation.
In March 2014, Germain Katanga (DRC) was convicted of being an accessory to war crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. His reparation liability was set at US$1 million for 297 victims. In 2017, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands provided earmarked donations to cover the full award. The individual payments of US$250 per victim were completed by the end of 2018, while the collective reparations, including housing, education, income-generating activities, and psychological support, were concluded by October 2023. A year later, the TFV submitted its final report to Trial Chamber II, which formally closed the proceedings in January 2025. So far, this is the only ICC reparations programme that has been successfully completed.
Attacking cultural heritage
In 2016, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi pleaded guilty to the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu, Mali, in June and July 2012. He was the first person convicted by the ICC of attacking cultural heritage. His reparations liability was set at €2.7 million (about US$3.14 million) in August 2017. The TFV secured earmarked contributions from Canada (€1.66 million – US$1.93 million), Norway (€515,000 – US$598,000), Germany (€110,000 – US$127,700), Italy, and the UK. Individual reparations to 1,689 victims, descendants of the saints whose mausoleums were destroyed, and those who depended on them for their livelihood, were completed in June 2024.
The collective phase was launched in October 2024 with the inauguration of a memorial in Timbuktu’s public square and 42 community socio-economic projects through the CIDEAL Foundation. The final phase of the reparations was expected to be completed in December 2025. There is no publicly available confirmation of this.
“The delivery of these collective reparations to the Timbuktu community marks an essential step in the implementation of the reparations decided by the judges in this case. Following the completion of individual reparations in June 2024, the final phase of this process now begins, with measures to support economic activity,” said Minou Tavárez Mirabal, the chairperson of the board of directors of the Trust Fund for Victims, in October 2024.
Sources described this as the ICC’s most successful reparation programme. This was attributed to the fact that the number of the eligible victims was clearly defined and identifiable, the geography was concentrated, and the donor states were responsive.
Bosco Ntaganda, nicknamed “The Terminator”, was, in July 2019, convicted of 18 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ituri, DRC, and was sentenced to the ICC’s maximum 30 years in prison. His reparations order of March 2021 set his liability at US$30 million, which was later revised to US$31.3 million. The order covers approximately 10,500 victims, 7,500 from violent attacks and 3,000 former child soldiers, with programmes including US$11 million in socio-economic support, US$5 million in psychological care, and US$4,000 per child soldier for rehabilitation.
War crimes and crimes against humanity
Australia earmarked AU$300,000 (about US$214,400) for sexual violence victims. As of March 2025, 1,702 beneficiaries were enrolled. The ICC judges had formally instructed the TFV officials to “continue exploring whether Ntaganda possessed any undiscovered assets” and monitor his finances “on an ongoing basis”.
In February 2021, Dominic Ongwen, a former commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army militia, was convicted of 61 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed between 2003 and 2005 in Northern Uganda, the largest number of convictions against a single individual in ICC history.
His reparations order, issued in February 2024, was for a liability of €52,429,000 (about US$61.1 million) for approximately 49,772 victims in four internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Northern Uganda. The breakdown includes €750 (about US$874) in symbolic payments to each eligible victim, €15 million (about US$17.5 million) in collective rehabilitation, and €100,000 (about US$116,500) for commemorative measures including apologies and cleansing ceremonies. To begin the reparation process, the TFV consulted roughly 3,000 victims in 2024.
As of April 2025, no state had contributed any funds to help in the implementation of the reparations. The TFV has launched a €5 million (about US$5.83 million) initial appeal, less than 10 per cent of the total order. The Programme Manager of the TFV, Scott Bartell, said the reparation programmes would proceed “as soon as funding is available”.
So far, no confirmed dedicated funding has been pledged for the reparations in the Al Hassan case, although Germany contributed €40,000 (US$46,600) to the proceedings in 2025.
The TFV’s secretariat and staff expenses are funded through the court’s assessed budget. However, its activities are financed through fines and forfeitures from convicted persons; voluntary contributions from States Parties to the Rome Statute and other donors; and limited allocations linked to the ICC’s assessed programme budget for administrative functions.
Article 75 of the Rome Statute places the primary obligation for the reparations on the convicted person, the perpetrator. The TFV may only complement that obligation. However, the reality so far has been quite different. The court has no enforcement mechanism to attach future assets of released convicts. It has no bailiff and no asset-seizure capacity independent of state cooperation. Most of the pending reparation files bear the instructions to “monitor finances on an ongoing basis”, but so far have not produced any concrete results.
According to ICC statements and audited reports, the fund’s financial position has remained structurally constrained over the past three years.
In 2023, the TFV recorded voluntary contributions of approximately €3.5 million (US$4.07 million) against programme expenditure of about €6.1 million (US$7.1 million), resulting in a deficit of roughly €2.4 million (US$2.8 million) and a continued drawdown of reserves. Total assets stood at about €15.5 million (US$18 million), with a net asset base of roughly €7.3 million (US$8.5 million), reflecting a downward trend in financial capacity.
READ MORE: There is no justice without reparations for victims of war, says Hollywood star
The Trust Fund for Victims
In 2024, voluntary contributions rose to approximately €6.8 million (US$7.9 million), helping to narrow but not eliminate the deficit. Programme expenditure remained higher than incoming voluntary funding, with the fund still operating below full cost recovery levels. Net assets continued to decline, reflecting the ongoing structural imbalance between income and reparations demand.
Reporting in early 2025 indicated continued volatility in donor inflows, with contributions concentrated among a small number of states and overall early-year funding significantly lower than annual requirements, reinforcing the fund’s reliance on a narrow and unpredictable donor base.
Annual voluntary contributions have consistently remained in the range of roughly €5 million to €7 million (US$5.68 million to US$8.9 million), while programme needs regularly exceed available funding, creating a persistent structural gap between judicial orders and implementation capacity.
Since 2004, the trust fund’s annual reports have indicated cumulative contributions exceeding €53 million (US$61.2 million) from 53 States Parties. The combined liability of the six reparations orders is approximately €171 million, more than three times the fund’s entire historical income. The assistance programmes alone require an additional €3 million (US$3.48 million) annually.
A small group of European and allied states account for the overwhelming share of the contributions. Sweden, contributing through its development agency Sida, is the largest and most consistent donor. The Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, France, Finland, Canada, Norway, Belgium, and the United Kingdom form the core group. In 2024, 29 states contributed €5.7 million (US$6.6 million).
During the first half of 2025, only 10 states contributed, totalling approximately €500,000 (US$580,200), while private individuals contributed €6,000 globally.
The ICC’s external auditor identified significant weaknesses in its review of the 2023 financial statements, noting that the TFV lacks consistent fundraising strategies and that its Strategic Plan for 2023-2025 contains no specific fundraising targets.
According to the audit report, the organisation’s total assets fell from €15.94 million (US$18.5 million) to €15.46 million (US$17.9 million), the net assets declined from €9.80 million (US11.4 million) to €7.38 million (US$8.6 million), the annual deficit widened from €1.14 million (US$1.3 million) to €2.43 million (UD$2.8 million). Voluntary contributions did not cover programme expenses, and the fund was spending down its reserves. As of August 2025, funding available for investment in 2025 and 2026 stood at €4.4 million (US$5.1 million).
Private fundraising campaign
In July 2025, for the first time in its history, the trust fund launched a private fundraising campaign targeting individuals, major donors, foundations, and corporations, to try to raise funds to meet its obligations.
“Contributions from private individuals through the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) are a tangible way to make reparations a reality and represent a powerful expression of solidarity and advocacy for victims,” Andres Parmas, the TFV board chairman, stated.
“Victims need meaningful reparations to rebuild their lives, their communities, and their future,” Paolina Massidda, the Principal Counsel of the OPCV, said.
The donations, collected via the crowdfunding platform WhyDonate, are meant to benefit medical and psychological rehabilitation, education, and livelihood support. They will also support initiatives to fight stigma suffered by survivors and foster the reconstruction of the social bonds within affected communities in relation to harms caused by crimes convicted in the context of the ICC situations in DRC, Mali, and Uganda. A total of €67,400 (US$78,200) had been raised by May 20, 2026.
The European Parliament passed a resolution in April 2025 calling on member states to contribute earmarked funds.
The financial pressures extend beyond the TFV to the ICC itself, whose 2025 programme budget was €202.6 million (US$235.1 million), a 10.4 per cent increase over 2024. However, the Committee on Budget and Finance has repeatedly noted that improved liquidity in recent years was “largely due to a major payment of arrears”, masking a chronically fragile baseline.
The ICC, which suffers perennial budget deficits due to members’ delayed contributions, has in recent years suffered even more pain due to the US-imposed sanctions on its operations and personnel as punishment for the court’s investigation of suspected war crimes involving American and Israeli citizens. Media reports have speculated that this has affected its finances and restricted the court’s activities, especially as donors are said to be withholding their assistance to the court for fear of retaliation from the Americans.
The Al Hassan reparations order adds another layer to the already complicated situation as it combines the largest victim pool in the ICC’s history with one of the world’s most difficult operating environments.
Timbuktu has been under recurring security threats since 2012, and Mali’s 2022 military coup has severed much of the country’s international diplomatic architecture. The French military has withdrawn, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) departed in 2023 after the new military junta ended its mandate. The Russian Wagner Group of mercenaries, restructured as the Africa Corps, is now operating in the region. The ICC has no field office in Mali and relies on its implementing partners, who are operating under extraordinary security protocols.
ALSO READ: Why ICC judge believes Kenya victims deserve reparations
Difficult operating environment
The TFV has operational infrastructure from the Al Mahdi case. The relationships that its three implementing partners – UNESCO, the CIDEAL Foundation, and CFOGRAD – have built with local authorities, community leaders, and diaspora networks in Bamako over the years offer a good foundation.
But the scale of the difference between the two cases is a big obstacle. The Al Mahdi case involved only 1,689 individual victims, while the Al Hassan situation has 65,202 estimated victims. The former’s victims were a bounded, identifiable group – mausoleum descendants, those whose livelihoods depended on the buildings. However, Al Hassan’s victims encompass a city-wide community subjected to surveillance, beatings, forced marriages, torture, and the suppression of everyday life under totalitarian religious police. The harm is diffuse, gendered, and psychologically complex. Registering and verifying 65,202 claimants in insecure northern Mali alone is likely to cost more than any single-year voluntary contribution the TFV has ever received.
The average €111 per victim sounds manageable, but it is not. The Al Mahdi programme, with 1,689 recipients, cost more than its €2.7 million court-ordered liability. Implementing the programme – victim reparations, operational costs, implementing partner fees, field security, verification processes, and community consultation – is likely to exceed the court-ordered liability of €7.25 million (US$8.41 million), even if all the funds are eventually raised. So far, no state has pledged any funds for the Al Hassan case.
And the reparations in the Ntaganda, Ongwen, and Lubanga cases are still pending.
The Rome Statute was built on the conviction that accountability is universal and indivisible. However, the reality seems to paint the picture of a court that can order justice but is unable to pay for it.
